INTRODUCTION
From its earliest descriptions,
Salmonella enterica subsp.
enterica serovar Dublin was noted for its propensity to cause septicemia (bloodstream infections) and sporadic outbreaks of salmonellosis in humans, often associated with the consumption of unpasteurized milk, and its association with cattle (
1–3).
S. Dublin has since been isolated from pigs, sheep, dogs, mice, and others, although decades of surveillance have shown a strong association with cattle and it is considered adapted to this host.
S. Dublin infections in cattle are of concern because they are difficult to control and give rise to systemic infections that can spread through herds, precipitating outbreaks of spontaneous abortion (
4). Control of
S. Dublin is complicated because some infected cattle may asymptomatically shed bacteria, promoting long-term pathogen persistence within herds (
5–7). Furthermore, inconsistent isolation of
S. Dublin from bovine body sites complicates infection control practices to reduce pathogen spread (
8,
9). Comprehensive surveillance of dairy herds in the United Kingdom has shown that
S. Dublin is prevalent (
10), and surveys of healthy animals at slaughter show that
S. Dublin is also present in meat-producing animals (
7,
11).
Infections of normally sterile body sites are termed invasive. These infections are difficult to treat and can be associated with high mortality rates. In nonindustrialized countries, the disease burden of invasive nontyphoidal
Salmonella infections is higher than in industrialized countries (
12,
13). Among nontyphoidal
Salmonella infections,
S. Dublin infections are highly invasive in humans, and a recent survey of U.S. infections showed that 75% of these infections required hospitalization, although the prevalence of
S. Dublin compared to that of other serovars was low (
14–18). Generally,
S. Dublin is considered to be susceptible to antimicrobials in surveys of healthy animals (
10,
19–22), while isolates recovered from sick humans and animals tend to exhibit decreased susceptibility (
23–27). Recently, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control has observed an increase in multidrug-resistant (MDR)
S. Dublin in a comprehensive survey of isolates from various surveillance streams (
18). While
S. Dublin human infections are rare, its propensity to cause invasive infections and the recent increase in incidence are of concern, especially where drug resistance may complicate treatment.
Public health surveillance and tracking of
Salmonella has traditionally been done using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, which has low discriminatory power for the highly related
Salmonella serovars, like
S. Dublin (
28). Many national public health surveillance programs are switching to whole-genome sequencing (WGS)-based technologies for their higher discriminatory power, the wide range of phenotypes that can be inferred, and the ability to perform sophisticated retrospective analysis. In addition, genomic surveillance allows for the tracking of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) determinants and mobile genetic elements that may facilitate their spread. Three recent communications have investigated
S. Dublin using WGS technologies, the work of Mohammed et al. (
29), Ågren et al. (
30), and Carroll et al. (
31), who investigated 9, 28, and 21 isolates, respectively, from small outbreaks or state-level investigations of either strictly bovine or human-derived isolates.
We previously reported on a Canadian
S. Dublin isolate bearing a novel hybrid resistance and virulence plasmid (pN13-01125), formed between an IncA/C
2 resistance plasmid originally isolated from
Salmonella enterica serovar Heidelberg (pSH696_135) and an
S. Dublin-specific virulence plasmid (
32). The hybridization was mediated by the action of an insertion element (IS
26), which is a member of the IS
6 family. Recently, the mechanism of IS
26 movement was demonstrated to occur by both a replicative and a conservative mode of cointegrate formation, which can resolve to cause large-scale genomic rearrangements, deletions, and consolidation of genetic factors, such as antimicrobial resistance determinants (
33–36). The replicative mode of action occurs through a novel translocatable unit, bearing a single copy of IS
6 with passenger genes that can integrate in either a random or a targeted fashion. Recent work has demonstrated that IS
26-driven genetic alterations can impact the host range of plasmids to facilitate replication in a new host (
37) and drive rearrangement of clinically important AMR plasmids (
38). Insertion sequence (IS) elements are implicated in the evolution of obligate and host-restricted organisms by a process of genome streamlining that follows a burst of IS activity and expansion (
39).
In this work, we report the increased number of invasive S. Dublin isolates in Canada from 2003 to 2015 at a national scale in both humans and bovines. Concomitantly with the rise in the number of invasive infections, we report a rise in MDR among S. Dublin isolates. Through a WGS-based investigation of 120 Canadian S. Dublin isolates of human and bovine origins, we identified a close network of isolates, suggesting transmission between sources. We extended this analysis to demonstrate that Canadian and U.S. isolates are closely related, circulating similar plasmids and mobile elements. Further, we use a novel circulating plasmid to elaborate an S. Dublin-specific mobile genetic network that may aid in improved surveillance design. S. Dublin is an important public health concern because of its ability to cause invasive infections in humans that are increasingly difficult to treat due to rising rates of MDR.
DISCUSSION
The rise in the incidence of human Canadian
S. Dublin is likely because of the acquisition of MDR or other epidemiological factors, rather than a change in intrinsic virulence. We queried the virulence factor database against our isolate’s WGS, in a manner previously described by our group (
28), and no gain or loss of virulence determinants could be associated with invasive or MDR isolates (data not shown). Additionally, some two-thirds of human
S. Dublin isolates described here were isolated from blood, which is in keeping with surveys of nontyphoidal
Salmonella in humans from other national and local outbreaks (
15,
41–44). What is distinctive is that the
S. Dublin isolates presented here are MDR; indeed, recent regional increases in MDR
S. Dublin strains have been described in American states that border Canada (
23,
24). This finding is further supported by the observation here that
S. Dublin isolates from the United States and Canada are highly similar. Alternatively, the relatedness of Canadian-U.S. isolates suggests that they may be spread by similar sources. For instance, the cross-border commercial distribution of animals might be responsible for the expansion of isolates. In sum, these data suggest that increases in MDR and/or epidemiological factors are the most parsimonious explanations for the rise in the incidence of Canadian
S. Dublin isolates.
The work presented here is the first national WGS-based survey of
S. Dublin, and we find that networks of MDR isolates show very little variation. The occurrence of MDR clusters containing both human and bovine isolates that differ by only 0 to 4 SNVs suggests possible zoonotic transmission. The interpretation criteria for SNV variation within the context of outbreak or epidemic events have not yet been clearly established for
S. Dublin. PulseNet has suggested that 5 SNVs at a 90% core-genome threshold for verotoxigenic
Escherichia coli O157:H7 is suggestive of outbreak-related strains in a study of Canadian isolates (
45). Recently, Ågren et al. examined 28 bovine isolates of
S. Dublin that were collected over a 4-year time span from a 20,000-km
2 region of southern Sweden (
30). From this data set, 537 variable positions survived quality filtering to support phylogenetic analysis where epidemiologically linked isolates ranged between 0 and 13 SNVs. Mohammed et al. compared
S. Dublin isolates from a human outbreak collected over 2 months from an Irish hospital (
29). The number of variable positions is not reported, but the authors found 1 and 9 SNVs between outbreak-related isolates and a 74- to 88-SNV difference between unrelated isolates collected from the same geographic area up to 3 years prior to the outbreak of interest. Finally, Carroll and coworkers examined 28
S. Dublin isolates from New York and Washington States from human and bovine sources (
31). The number of variable positions within state clusters ranged from 4 to 48 SNVs. In the work presented here, our phylogeny of 120 isolates is supported by 2,517 high-quality-filtered SNVs drawn from a core genome that represents 4.5 × 10
6 nucleotides, or 92% of the reference genome length. For WGS-based phylogenomic reports, we suggest that the number of total variable sites and core-genome sizes are also reported to facilitate comparison of methods and data.
The close networks of mixed human and bovine isolates cannot suggest a specific source or inform on the transmission chain without detailed epidemiological investigations. Transmission may be associated with the handling of infected animals or environmental exposure on farms with infected herds, as has been previously described (
46). The consumption of unpasteurized dairy products, including raw milk cheese, might be a potential source, although no information in Canada exists for this commodity as a risk for
S. Dublin infections (
47–49). A recent large multidecade epidemiological investigation of
S. Dublin in the United States found that 99% of outbreak isolates were traced back to dairy sources (
18). Currently sequenced Canadian and U.S.
S. Dublin populations are genetically similar, and raw milk is legally available for sale in many northern U.S. states that border Canada. Future Canadian surveillance efforts should investigate the potential for a U.S.-Canada component to the increase in the incidence of
S. Dublin infections described here.
WGS-based surveillance of pathogens is rapidly becoming standard practice for international public health surveillance programs. Public Health England has switched to genotypic tests for
Salmonella, the U.S. CDC has recently published benchmarking data for genome-based AMR detection in
Salmonella (
50), and Canada implemented WGS for all
Salmonella isolates in May 2017. Using a workflow similar to that of the U.S. CDC for AMR detection, our correspondence between phenotype and genotype are in agreement with the CDC study only when we correct for transposon-inactivated genes. Small changes at the beginning or end of gene boundaries and nucleotide changes can be frequent enough that the gains from the automation of WGS-based AMR detection must be balanced by the human intervention required to notice biologically significant variants. AMR detection relies on using thresholds of sequence identity and coverage because natural variation presents too many gene variants to be examined manually. The work presented here suggests that particularly in the validation stage, both the sequence and integrity of the gene should be considered when detecting AMR, as we found in
S. Dublin that IS
26 replication had compromised the integrity of
blaTEM-1B and
strA and altered the expression of their phenotypes.
The emergence of invasive S. Dublin is concomitant with the rise in MDR and the influence of IS26 in Canada. Our group has recently described how IS26 replication promoted the fusion of an S. Dublin virulence plasmid and an IncA/C2 MDR plasmid to form a hybrid plasmid (pN13-01125) that is 30 kbp smaller than the parental plasmids. Nearly half of resistant isolates (42/89) described here were influenced by IS26 replication through the truncation and inactivation. These alterations may serve to streamline the plasmids that likely promote adaptive benefits.
Recently, Porse and coworkers demonstrated that IS
26 replication facilitated the long-term stability and alteration of the host range of a
Klebsiella plasmid as it adapted to replication in
Escherichia in an
in vitro model of evolution (
37). Interestingly, in that work, a large deletion of the plasmid of genes involved in conjugation was among a large-scale deletion that facilitated host range adaption. In the work presented here, we observe similar plasmid modifications, as some isolates bearing a nonhybrid plasmid have nonintuitively lost these regions as well. IS expansion is a documented driver of evolution and is observed in species that adopt host-restricted lifestyles. Here, vigorous replication of IS elements drive mutation and rearrangement of genetic material, which is then followed by IS-mediated curation of genetic material that promotes adaptive fitness (reviewed in reference
39). In the context of this work, we observed the initial expansion and consolidation of genetic material, and further surveillance is required to follow what genetic streamlining and adaptation may follow. Additionally, we see that the first plasmids to emerge in Canadian
S. Dublin isolates are also those that carry the most numerous IS
26 insertions, supporting the idea that a burst of IS
26 activity facilitates plasmid host range expansion in
S. Dublin. Finally, the pN13-01125 plasmid conjugates at a low frequency and is stably inherited (
32), which suggests that AMR determinants may become fixed within the population of circulating MDR
S. Dublin strains in North America, as these two populations appear to be homogenous.
The distribution of plasmid genes in this work suggest a plasmid gene network that is widely distributed among non-host-restricted serovars, such as S. Typhimurium and S. Newport. These prevalent serovars likely serve as conduits of horizontal gene transfer to host-adapted serovars, such as S. Dublin. Despite the fact that S. Enteritidis is the most frequently isolated human serovar in Canada and other countries, it appears to be excluded from this network of resistance- and plasmid-associated genes, and further work is warranted to understand the determinants of the actual conduits of transfer between Salmonella serovars and confirm that the plasmid gene network elaborated here reflects circulating plasmids. Finally, some caution is warranted, as the NCBI SRA is highly biased toward U.S. isolates and global sampling is similarly biased to isolates of medical importance. However, the plasmid network analysis is supported by a large number of isolates from a single continental area, and at least for the S. Dublin population, they are genetically similar.
Current public health surveillance of bacterial pathogens is focused on ascertaining genetic relatedness and AMR gene complementation to investigate outbreaks, monitor AMR trends, and inform antibiotic stewardship; however, tools to predict outbreaks and AMR expansions are lacking. This work suggests that examining the prevalence of mobile genetic elements, such as IS elements, might have predictive power in identifying pathogen subpopulations that are undergoing accelerated evolution and might warrant enhanced surveillance. Furthermore, future delineation of the plasmid networks of pathogens may better inform resource allocation and surveillance design to better capture the full complement of circulating plasmids.
Conclusions.
The number of Canadian human cases of S. Dublin infections is low but increasing, which is concerning because of the emergence of MDR isolates with resistance to 5 or 6 classes of antimicrobials and the increase in bloodstream infections. In addition, the small number of SNVs identified between human and cattle isolates suggests potential zoonotic transmission, although a clear source of these infections has not been identified. IS26 replication appears to have promoted alterations to the AMR patterns in S. Dublin, with unclear consequences. Canada continues to closely monitor this issue through CIPARS, and further targeted studies are planned to better understand the risk factors and source attributions of MDR S. Dublin infections in Canada.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We acknowledge Colleen Peterson, Melissa McCracken, Shaun Tyler, Morag Graham, and the staff at the NML Genomics Core Facility for whole-genome sequencing support. We acknowledge Gary Van Domselaar and the staff of the NML Bioinformatics group, particularly Aaron Petkau and Peter Kruczkiewicz, for helpful discussions. We acknowledge Andrea Desruisseau, Chad Gill, Laura Mataseje, Russell Mandes, and Stacie Langner for their contributions toward susceptibility testing of the isolates. Finally, we acknowledge Phelim Bradley and Zamin Iqbal of the Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Genetics for their assistance with BIGSI queries.
Members of the Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Public Health Partnership were as follows: Linda Hoang, British Columbia Centres for Disease Control Public Health Microbiology & Reference Laboratory, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada; Marie Louie, Provincial Laboratory for Public Health, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; Roy Romanow, Saskatchewan Disease Control Centre Laboratory, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada; David C. Alexander, Cadham Provincial Laboratory, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada; Vanessa Allen, Public Health Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, Canada; David Haldane, Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada; Greg J. German, Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada; Sameh El Bailey, Saint John Regional Hospital, St. John, New Brunswick, Canada; and George Zahariadis, Newfoundland Public Health Laboratory, St. Johns, Newfoundland, Canada.